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ABSTRACT 
The end of Apartheid and the transition to a new constitutional democracy in South Africa 
was ushered in by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The purpose of the TRC 
was to promote a dialogue between victims and perpetrators of gross human rights 
violations to try and achieve reconciliation in the country. To this end, the TRC was given 
the power to grant conditional amnesty to those who came forward to reveal the full truth 
to the country about the crimes that they had committed. Those who refused to apply for 
amnesty  or who did apply but were denied amnesty were supposed to be prosecuted. A 
number of years have passed since the final TRC report was submitted and hardly any 
prosecutions have taken place. This paper argues, by comparing the transitions in Argentina 
and Chile to the one in South Africa, that the lack of post-Truth Commission prosecutions in 
South Africa has contributed to nurturing a culture of impunity for acts of corruption in high 
offices of state. It argues that in countries transitioning from repressive and authoritarian 
regimes to democratic governments, prosecutions of gross human rights violations are 
necessary for the creation and strengthening of the rule of law and a human rights culture. 
Therefore, the impunity for economic crimes such as corruption is detrimental to 
democracy.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW OF STUDY 
1. Introduction 
At the end of Apartheid, the question that South Africa was confronted with was what was 
to be done about the perpetrators of the gross human rights violations committed under 
the repressive Apartheid regime. The choice that South Africa had to make was one that 
would either bring peace to the country or hurl it into a devastating civil war. South Africa 
chose to pursue peace by establishing a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and 
granting conditional amnesty to the perpetrators of gross human rights violations. 
International human rights norms and international experience show that in order to 
achieve unity and morally acceptable reconciliation, it is necessary that the newly-
established government deal with gross human rights violations in a way that ensures that 
the following requirements for truth-finding are met. The first is that the truth must be 
established by an official investigation unit that uses fair procedures. The second is that the 
truth must be acknowledged fully and unreservedly by the perpetrators, and lastly, the truth 
must be made known to the public.1  
The emergence of truth commissions and amnesty laws in Latin America in the 1980s has 
shown that amnesty laws can be problematic and undesirable, as they can be abused for 
political purposes. Argentina provides an example of the strengths and weaknesses of early 
truth commissions, while the case of the Chilean truth commission shows how the granting 
of amnesty can be used to shield members of the repressive regime from prosecution, thus 
                                                          
1
  The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Bill No. 30 of 1995, explanatory memorandum to 
the Parliamentary Bill.  
 
 
 
 
2 
 
resulting in impunity. South Africa’s transition was not identical to that of other 
transitioning nations, as it was not the result of a revolution, but of intense negotiations. 
This implied necessarily that there would be no relentless criminal prosecutions of officials 
of the former Apartheid regime who were alleged to have committed gross human rights 
violations.2 Twenty-one years into democracy, there is one issue which dominates public 
discourse in South Africa Today: corruption in the upper echelons of government.3  
Another issue which flares up now and again, but only for a few days and then it subsides 
again, is the issue of why post-truth commission prosecutions did not take place, despite the 
fact that most of the applications for amnesty were declined by the Truth Commission. The 
applications came from people who had appeared before the human rights committee of 
the Truth Commission, as well as those who did not appear before it because they were 
already in prison, serving a sentence for some other offence, not related to human rights, of 
which they had been found guilty. But there was another group of people, the number of 
which cannot be established, who looked upon the Truth Commission with disdain, and who 
simply did not bother appearing before it, even though they were suspected of having been 
complicit in the torture, death and disappearance of Apartheid opponents in the past. Yet, 
to date, hardly any prosecutions have been instituted against those who were denied 
amnesty. 4  
It is not as though the issue of non-prosecutions is something that crops up in daily 
conversations, but when it does, as happened in 2015 in the case of Nokuthula, which is 
                                                          
2
  Fernandez L ‘Post-TRC Prosecutions in South Africa’, in Werle G (ed.) Justice in Transition- Prosecution 
and Amnesty in Germany and South Africa vol. 29 BWV Verlag (2006) 76. 
3
  ‘Why is corruption getting worse in South Africa?’ Corruption Watch available at 
http://www.corruptionwatch.org.za/why-is-corruption-getting-worse-in-south-africa/ (accessed 12 
August 2015).  
4
  Bubenzer O Post-TRC Prosecutions in South Africa: Accountability for political crimes after the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission’s Amnesty Process Martinus Nijhoff (2009) 14. 
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dealt with below; it provokes anger and frustration among the victims. What annoys them is 
that, although they have received reparations, which consisted of paltry sum money, the 
fact that no prosecutions have taken place deprives families and relatives of an opportunity 
to know where the remains are of their loved ones or friends who were killed or 
disappeared. From their point of view, and from that of considerable segments of society, 
failure to prosecute means that there are some people who are indeed above the law and 
who are immune from prosecution.  
The second concern in South Africa today is that the promises made by politicians during 
the political transition that a new government would be transparent and accountable, is 
undermined by unending allegations of corruption and misappropriation of public funds in 
the highest echelons of government. Many, if not most, of these allegations are not 
investigated by the criminal justice authorities and followed up with prosecutions. In the 
few instances where investigations do take place, for example, by the public protector, the 
National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) seems hesitant to go into action. 
It is therefore difficult to escape the impression that corruption is not punishable when 
committed by those in high state offices or at the local government level. The principles of 
honest and ethically wholesome governance, fought for by many who were murdered, 
torture or disappeared by the agents of Apartheid, and for the sake of whom the Truth 
Commission was established, have given way to corruption and moral decay in offices of 
state. But corruption is not only a crime; it is a human rights issue as well, and the effects of 
certain corrupt acts impair the enjoyment of socio-economic, civil and political rights. To 
have to pay a bribe in order to gain access to a school, a clinic, employment, housing, or to 
obtain a passport are examples of how bribery can have an impact on human rights. 
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1.1. Theoretical assumptions and research question 
The basis of this paper is that the high prevalence of corruption within the South African 
government at present, which is eating away at the moral principles enunciated in the TRC’s 
recommendations, is in part due to the political lethargy and absence of a strong political 
will to pursue post-TRC prosecutions. The assumption made here is that if corrupt state 
officials are aware of the fact that there have been no prosecutions in respect of gross 
human rights violations perpetrated under Apartheid and which resulted in the torture, 
disappearances and killings of hundreds of people, what would make them think that they 
will not enjoy impunity for embezzling taxpayers’ money – a mere economic crime? To 
determine whether indeed a connection can be argued, this paper will compare South Africa 
to two Latin American countries, namely, Argentina and Chile, which had truth commissions 
also during their transition from dictatorship to democracy. Although both Argentina and 
Chile have encountered different challenges and outcomes in their transition, they make for 
good comparative cases because both post-TRC Chile and post-TRC Argentina played a 
major role in helping South Africa to set up its TRC.  
In the light of what is stated above, the question that this research paper seeks to answer is 
this: Has the failure to conduct post-TRC prosecutions in South Africa contributed to the 
weakening of the rule of law and the start of a drift towards a state of affairs where 
government officials can commit acts of corruption with impunity? 
1.2. Research methodology   
The study begins by discussing the truth commissions of South Africa, Argentina and Chile, 
and, thereafter, it deals with how each of the countries has gone about the amnesty 
question of prosecuting perpetrators of gross human rights violations under the respective 
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predecessor regimes. Each country is dealt with individually, and thereafter the comparisons 
are drawn. This study will rely on library research and will make use of both primary and 
secondary sources. 
1.3. The South African Truth Commission 
The Epilogue of the Interim Constitution5 expressed very eloquently the philosophy of 
national unity and reconciliation that would guide the drafting of the final Constitution as 
underpinned by the constitutional principles. The parliament of the new democratic South 
Africa, in response to the gross human rights violations committed during the Apartheid era, 
enacted a law that established the TRC.6 The TRC was created to promote national unity and 
reconciliation in the spirit of an understanding that transcends the conflicts and divisions of 
the past. To achieve this goal, gross human rights violations were to be investigated to 
establish as complete a picture as possible of the nature, causes and extent of such 
violations.7 More than this, the TRC was charged with the task of making recommendations 
on how such gross injustices could be avoided in the future. 
In October of 1998, the TRC presented its final five-volume report of its findings to then 
President Mandela.8 The report documents comprehensively the Apartheid structure and 
the roles played by key state functionaries of the state in implementing the policies of the 
apartheid regime. It catalogues the heinous human rights violations committed under the 
                                                          
5
  Constitution of the Republic of South Act 200 of 1993 (The interim Constitution). 
6
  Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 (The TRC Act). 
7
  Hamber B ‘“Ere their story die”: truth, justice and reconciliation in South Africa’ Race and Class Vol. 
44(1) (2002) 62.  
8
  A sixth volume containing the Amnesty Committee’s final report, and a seventh volume summarizing 
the victim findings were released in 2001. 
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Apartheid legal order, and these include torture, abductions, judicial and extra-judicial 
killings and the unjustified use of deadly force.9 
The final report emphasised that Apartheid was indeed a crime against humanity and that 
although the Apartheid government was responsible for most of the human rights violations 
between 1960 and 1994, the resistance movements that fought against Apartheid were also 
guilty of gross human rights violations.10 The TRC was empowered to grant conditional 
amnesty to perpetrators of gross human rights violations that came forward with full details 
about the crimes that they committed, as provided for by the TRC Act.11 This was 
accompanied by the understanding that those who did not apply for amnesty or those who 
were denied amnesty would be liable for criminal prosecutions in the post-TRC period. The 
TRC handed over to the National Prosecuting Authority a list of some 640 prosecutable 
cases and stated in its recommendations that in the interests of pursuing national 
reconciliation, it was necessary that prosecutions be instituted. The information gathered by 
the TRC had effectively laid down the ground work for such prosecutions.12 To date, hardly 
any prosecutions have taken place. 
1.4. The Argentinian Truth Commission 
In March of 1976, Argentina was taken over by a series of military juntas which were a result 
of a coup. This led to a seven-year armed struggle between the military dictatorship and the 
opposition, the so called ‘subversives’.13 The dictatorship was characterised by 
disappearances which allowed for the most extreme forms of torture to take place without 
                                                          
9
  Graybill L Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: Miracle or Model? Lynn Rienner Publishers (2002) 
145. 
10
  Graybill (2002) 145. 
11
  Section 20(1) of the TRC Act.  
12
  Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Almonacid Arellano v Chile, Judgment of 26 September 2006. 
13
  http://www.usip.org/publications/truth-commission-Argentina (accessed 07/10/2015) 
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any political or legal interferences or prohibitions.14 Although there were thousands of 
reports filed with international bodies and organizations such as the Inter-America Court of 
Human Rights and the United Nations Human Rights Division; and from bodies such as the 
Permanent Assembly for Human Rights, the dictatorship managed to offset all allegations. 
When President Raul Alfosín came to power in 1983, he created a Commission called the 
National Commission on the Disappearances of People (Comisión Nacional sobre la 
Desaparición de Personas: CONADEP) by presidential decree. It was headed by the highly 
acclaimed Argentinian novelist Ernesto Sábato. The commissioners were prestigious people 
from different professions, including law, journalism, science and religion. Its mandate was 
to “inquire into the fate of the disappeared, locate abducted children, report to the court 
any attempt to conceal or destroy any evidence, and, lastly, to issue a final report”.15  
Human rights organisations opposed the Commission initially, but their resistance ebbed 
when they realised that it offered them the best opportunity of uncovering the truth about 
people who were made to disappear (usually referred to as the ‘disappeared’).16 This 
change of mind helped to disabuse critics of the idea that the Commission existed merely to 
receive accusations, which it would then channel to the courts for prosecution. It became 
clear that this Commission was indeed a real truth commission.17 The Commission’s 
investigations led ultimately to the discovery of hundreds of previously unknown, 
clandestine detention centres where atrocities had been perpetrated on opponents of the 
                                                          
14
  Crenzel E ‘Argentina’s National Commission on the Disappearances of Persons: Contribution to 
Transitional justice’ International Journal of Transitional Justice vol. 2 (2008) 174. 
15
  National Executive Decree 187, 15 December 1983. 
16
  Crenzel (2008) 179. 
17
  Crenzel (2008) 181. 
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former junta regime. This finding was a major breakthrough, and was covered widely by the 
media.18 
The Commission submitted its full report, entitled Nunca Más (Never Again), to the 
President nine months after starting its work. A shorter, version of the report was produced 
and published as a book by a private publishing house, in co-operation with the 
government. It became a best seller in no time, with 40 000 copies sold on the first day it 
appeared on the bookstands, and 150 000 copies in the first eight weeks. It is the bestselling 
book in Argentinian history, and can be found, today still, in many kiosks around Buenos 
Aires.19 
President Alfonsin’s civilian government then moved quickly to repeal the amnesty that the 
military had granted itself. The Commission turned over the evidence it had collected to the 
state prosecutor and this resulted in criminal trials in which five of the former junta military 
generals were found guilty and sentenced to terms of imprisonment.20  
1.5. The Chilean Truth Commission 
In September of 1973, the Chilean civil government was overthrown by General Augusto 
Pinochet in a coup. The Pinochet dictatorship lasted 17 years and was characterised by 
brutal repression of all political opposition.21 Over a thousand people were killed or 
disappeared and thousands more unlawfully detained or tortured. There was a conspicuous 
lack of judicial prosecutions, and in 1978 Pinochet decreed an amnesty law (Decree Law No. 
                                                          
18
  Crenzel (2008) 181. 
19
  Hayner (2001) 34. 
20
  Hayner (2001) 34. 
21
  Hayner (2001) 35. 
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2.191), which barred prosecution for almost all crimes that had occurred since the coup and 
which violated human rights.22  
In 1988, Patricio Aylwin was elected to be President of Chile and assumed office in 1990. 
Pinochet, however, had ensured, through an amendment of the constitution, that he would 
retain his autonomy and his political position as the commander in chief of the army and a 
position as senator for life. Six weeks after President Aylwin assumed office, he created the 
National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation through presidential decree commonly 
known as the Rettig Commission, and named after its chairman Raúl Rettig, a former 
ambassador under President Salavador Allende. It quickly became clear that it would be 
impossible to nullify Pinochet’s amnesty provision and pursue prosecutions for the human 
rights abuses of the predecessor regime. Aylwin, therefore, opted for a policy of 
investigation and truth finding.23 Aylwin elected eight people to serve on the Commission. 
Four were former supporters of Pinochet and the other four had been in the opposition. 
This was a deliberate choice by the administration to ensure that the Commission would not 
be perceived as being biased. This proved to be a wise decision because the Truth 
Commission report was unanimously supported by the members of the Commission.24  
The Rettig Commission’s mandate was limited to investigating “disappearances after arrest, 
executions, and torture leading to death committed by government agents or people in 
their service, as well as kidnappings and attempts on the life of the persons carried out by 
private citizens for political reasons”.25 Cases of torture that did not result in death were 
excluded. It is estimated that there are between 50 000 and 200 000 torture survivors who 
                                                          
22
  Hayner (2001) 35. 
23
  Hayner (2001) 35. 
24
  Hayner (2001) 35. 
25
  Decree Establishing the National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, Supreme Decree No. 355, 
Chile, April 25, 1990, reprinted in Kritz, Transitional Justice, vol. 3, 102. 
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were identified by the Commission but were not included in the list of victims because of 
this strict mandate.26  The Commission did not have any powers of subpoena and was 
therefore dependent on the co-operation of the public. This proved to be an impediment as 
it received very little co-operation from the armed forces. The report totalled 1 800 pages 
with over 95 per cent of the human rights violations, as defined by the Commission, 
attributed to state agents.27 
The report of the Commission which was handed over to the President was publicized after 
several weeks, and President Aylwin gave an emotional apology on behalf of the state. In his 
apology, he begged for forgiveness from the people, recognising the suffering of the victims 
and emphasising the need for forgiveness and reconciliation, and also asked the armed 
forces to make reparations. The report, however, was not well received by Pinochet. He 
expressed “fundamental disagreement” by insisting that the army had saved the freedom of 
the country, although he did not question specific aspects of the report. 28 
The report was reproduced as a daily insert in the newspaper but only a few copies of the 
report itself were printed. An attempted assassination of a close associate and confidante of 
Pinochet in three attacks within only four weeks of the report having been released, shifted 
all focus from the report and effectively resulted in the abandonment of the reconciliation 
processes altogether. 29 
                                                          
26
  A second commission known as the Valech Commission was created by Supreme Decree No. 1040 in 
September of 2003 by President Ricardo Lagos. It had the mandate of investigating and documenting 
civil and political rights abuses perpetrated between September 11, 1973 and March 10, 1990. It was 
also mandated in accordance with Supreme Decree 1086 to identify victims for purposes of reparations 
as the strict scope of the Rettig Commission excluded a large number of victims. For purposes of this 
paper, this commission will not be discussed.  
27
  Hayner (2001) 36. 
28
  Hayner (2001) 37. 
29
  Hayner (2001) 37. 
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Despite the lack of sufficient public attention to the TRC report, Chile made considerable 
gains in its reparations program for families of the killed and disappeared. This was because 
the report of the Commission resulted in the establishment of a follow-up Commission, the 
National Corporation for Reparation and Reconciliation. Its mandate was to continue 
investigations into outstanding cases, locating the disappeared and organizing the Truth 
Commission’s report for public distribution.30 
The Truth Commission did not create an environment for the free discussion of human 
rights violations as this was considered in to be in “bad taste”. It was not until Senator 
Pinochet stepped down as commander-in-chief and was indicted by the Spanish Judge 
Baltazar Garzón, that Chile’s domestic criminal justice authorities became active. Judge 
Garzón relied heavily on the report of the Truth Commission, even citing a part of the report 
in the arrest warrant against Pinochet.31 
South Africa, Chile and Argentina have important common elements. Firstly, it can be seen 
that in all three countries widespread prosecutions of perpetrators during the transition 
were not possible. Although the underlying reasons for the inability to prosecute differ from 
one country to the next, it is undeniable that there was a need for a transitional justice 
mechanism that would usher the countries into democracy and make known the gross 
human rights violations committed by past regimes. Secondly, the truth commissions were 
not intended to be a substitute for prosecutions, but were intended to form the basis for 
prosecutions that would take place, as they created a reliable context to the atrocities. 
Therefore, the point of departure of this paper is that the truth commissions fulfilled the 
                                                          
30
  Hayner (2001) 37. 
31
  Hayner (2001) 37. 
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purposes for which they were created and that prosecutions are a crucial second stage of 
transition. 
1.6. The amnesty clauses in the TRC Act 
The TRC Act was enacted for establishing as complete a picture as possible of the nature, 
causes and extent of the gross human rights violations that were committed during the 
period from 1 March 1960 to the cut-off date contemplated in the Constitution. This was to 
be done through investigations of the events that emanated from conflicts of the past and 
to determine the fate or whereabouts of the victims of such violations. It provided that 
amnesty would be granted to persons who would make full disclosure of all the relevant 
facts that related to the violations provided they were committed within the context of the 
conflict and were in furtherance of a political objective.32 
The purpose of the Act was premised on the principle that reconciliation depends on 
forgiveness, which can only be achieved through the disclosure of all gross human rights 
violations. Reconciliation through nation-building was what was envisioned.33  
1.6.1. The condition for granting amnesty 
An application for amnesty could be granted only when it was made in relation to the 
commission of a crime that constituted a gross human rights violation. A gross violation of 
human rights was defined as meaning the violation of human rights through acts such as the 
killing, abduction, torture or severe ill-treatment of any person.34 It included in the 
                                                          
32
  Preamble to the TRC Act. 
33
  TRC Act (1995) Explanatory memorandum to the parliamentary Bill available at 
http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/legal/bill.htm (accessed on 05 June 2015). 
34
  Section 1(a) of the TRC Act (1995). 
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definition “any attempt, conspiracy, instigation, command or procurement to commit” any 
of these acts.35  
In order for the amnesty to be granted, the person applying for amnesty must satisfy the 
amnesty committee that the act, omission or offence was, firstly, associated with a political 
objective, secondly, that it falls within the specified time frame and, thirdly, that full 
disclosure has been made.36 Full disclosure was required in terms of the interim 
Constitution and demanded an inquiry into the state of mind of the applicant. It was 
therefore necessary that the Commission be chaired by a judge37 because the enquiries also 
included the weighing and judging of evidence.38 
The Norgaard principles, laid down by the Norwegian professor Carl A. Norgaard, were used 
as guiding principles for the conditions of granting amnesty. These principles were provided 
for in Section 20(3) of the TRC Act, and would be used to determine whether the political 
objective requirement was satisfied.  The first principle was that the motive of the person, 
such as the act,39 omission or offence should not have been committed for personal malice 
of financial gain.40 The second principle related to the context of the act, such as whether it 
was committed in the course of a political uprising, disturbance or event, or in reaction 
thereto.41 The third principle required a determination of the legal and factual nature of the 
act, as well as its gravity. The fourth principle involved the determination of the object or 
objective of the act, particularly whether it was directed at a political opponent, state 
                                                          
35
  Section 1(b) of the TRC Act (1995). 
36
  Explanatory memorandum (1995). 
37
  Section 17(3) of the TRC Act (1995). 
38
  Explanatory memorandum (1995). 
39
  The word ‘act’ will be used throughout this paper to include “act, omission and offence” as 
contemplated in the provisions of the TRC Act. 
40
  Section 3(f) (i) and (ii) of the TRC Act (1995). 
41
  Section 3(b) of the TRC Act (1995). 
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property or personnel, or against private property or individuals.42 The fifth principle sought 
to determine whether the act was committed in execution of an order or on behalf of an 
organisation, institution or liberation movement of which the person who committed the 
act was a member, supporter or agent.43 The last consideration was the relationship 
between the act and the political objective pursued, particularly the directness, the 
proximity and the proportionality between the act and the political objective.44 
During the TRC process, the Commission received roughly 20 000 statements from victims 
and their families. The Commission also received about 7 000 applications for amnesty, of 
which only 849 were granted. Many of the applications were rejected because they did not 
meet the requirement of acts committed with a political objective.45 A list of about 300 
names was submitted to the National Prosecution Authority with recommendations from 
the TRC that prosecutions take place.46 
Section 20(8) of the TRC Act provided that if any person who was standing trial, or had been 
convicted of the act and was serving a sentence, was granted amnesty, all proceedings 
would be void and the sentence would lapse. The person who was granted amnesty was 
exempt from both criminal and civil liability, which extended to precluding civil claims 
against anyone who may have been vicariously liable, such as the government.47 Amnesty 
also had the effect of expunging from any official documents, any entry or record of the 
person’s conviction.48 
                                                          
42
  Section 3(c) of the TRC Act (1995). 
43
  Section 3(d) of the TRC Act (1995). 
44
  Section 3(f) of the TRC Act (1995). 
45
  Gibson J ‘Truth, Justice and Reconciliation: Judging the fairness of amnesty in South Africa’ American 
Journal of Political Science 46 (2000) 542.  
46
  Bubenzer (2009) 18. 
47
  Section 20(7)(c) of the TRC Act (1995). 
48
  Section 20(10) of the TRC Act (1995). 
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If amnesty were refused, then the court that had any suspended matter before it against 
the applicant would have to be notified of the outcome and no adverse inference could be 
drawn from it.49 
1.6.2. The public attitude to the amnesty clause 
Between November of 2000 and February of 2001, Gibson interviewed 3 727 people to 
determine what their attitudes to the TRC process were. The survey found that, in general, 
South Africans were not opposed to the granting of amnesty. A 57.3 % majority of the 
people approved of amnesty, at least to some extent. The survey found also that race 
played a significant role in the answers given, with 71.6 % of black people approving of 
amnesty, whereas in the case of whites, coloureds and Asians, it was less than the 
majority.50 However, the approval expressed for amnesty was not tantamount to its 
endorsement as being fair, for 72.7 % South Africans found it to be unfair to those who died 
in the struggle and 65.2 % believed it to be unfair to the victims. Only 33.5 % of South 
Africans found it to be fair in general. The disparity between public approval and the 
perception of fairness indicated that the amnesty provisions were seen as being a necessary 
evil for ensuring a peaceful transition to democracy.51  
1.6.3. The significance of the amnesty question in present-day South Africa 
One of the tenets of justice is the concept of retribution. Retribution is defined as a 
“passionate reaction to the violation of a rule, norm or law that evokes a desire for 
punishment of the violator”.52 Retribution is considered to be an older, more primitive and 
                                                          
49
  Section 21(2) (a) and (b) of the TRC Act (1995). 
50
  Gibson (2000) 545. 
51
  Gibson (2000 545.   
52
  Sanders et al. ‘Justice and Legal Institutions’ in Joseph, Sanders and Hamilton (eds.) Handbook of Justice 
Research in Law Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers (2001) 6. 
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more socially recognised feeling by individuals who are dissociated from the victim.53 The 
primary assumption of the amnesty provision is that for the victims to lose their right to 
their day in court, also means that the society as a whole loses its right to retribution. 
Because the victims themselves fail to receive justice, society as a whole also fails to receive 
justice.54 If this assumption is true, then the failure of the NPA to prosecute those who were 
denied amnesty, not only affects the victims, but also everyone in the country, including 
both present and future generations.  
Furthermore, a transition cannot begin and end with the work of a truth commission; it is 
ultimately dependent on the government to give effect to the recommendations made by 
the truth commission. Implementing measures that undermine prosecutions in spite of the 
TRC recommendations is tantamount to a dereliction of duty.  
1.7. Overview of chapters 
Chapter two discusses the actions taken by the respective governments to deal with the 
issue of prosecutions. In the case of South Africa, it will discuss the special units established 
for post-TRC prosecutions. In the case of Argentina and Chile, it will discuss the challenges 
and successes of the prosecutions. 
Chapter three will focus on South Africa and will discuss the political influence exerted upon 
institutions that are meant to act without fear or prejudice. This chapter will establish and 
justify the link that exists between the failure to pursue comprehensive prosecutions and 
the derogation of the rule from law in South Africa. 
                                                          
53
  Hogan et al. ‘Retributive Justice’ in Lerner M and Lerner S (eds.) The Justice Motive in Social Behaviour: 
Adapting to Times of Scarcity and Change Springer Science & Business Media (1981) 131.  
54
  Gibson (2000) 546. 
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The fourth and final chapter draws together the main findings through a discussion of the 
principle of the rule of law and accountability. It will engage with the experiences of 
Argentina and Chile and draw from them lessons for South Africa. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
PROSECUTION EFFORTS FOLLOWING TRUTH COMMISSIONS 
2. Introduction 
This first part of this chapter discusses the various special units which were created under 
the NPA to manage the post-TRC prosecutions. The second part looks at how Argentina and 
Chile have responded to the need to institute prosecutions. The chapter will conclude by 
comparing the approaches in the three countries.  
2.1. South Africa  
In the build-up to the first democratic elections in 1994, South Africa was plagued by 
unprecedented waves of violence and intimidation, as a result of which the then President F 
De Klerk established the Goldstone Commission (named after its chairperson) to investigate 
the violence. 55  
When the Goldstone Commission ended its task in 1993/1994, the task of investigating 
gross human rights abuses was assigned to the then Attorney-General of Pretoria Dr Jan 
D’Oliveira.56 At the end of 1998, when the work of the team of D’Oliveira came to an end, 
the prosecution service had been restructured completely. A new and centralised National 
Prosecuting Authority (NPA) had been created and D’Oliveira became one of the first deputy 
National Directors of Public Prosecutions (NDPP) under the national Director of Public 
Prosecutions, Bulelani Ngcuka. The members of his previous unit were incorporated into the 
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  Section 7(1) (d) of Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation Act 139 of 1991. 
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newly-created Directorate of Special Operations (DSO), the so-called “Scorpions,” 
established in September 1999.57   
2.1.1. The Human Rights Investigative Unit (HRIU) 
In early 1999, the then Minister of Justice, Dullah Omar, established the Human Rights 
Investigative Unit (HRIU) headed by an attorney, Vincent Saldanha. Its mandate was to 
“review, investigate and possibly prosecute all cases falling within the ambit of the TRC Act 
for which amnesty had been refused or had not been applied for”. 58 According to Saldanha, 
the unit adopted a human rights and victim-oriented approach, as many of the unit’s 
members had been involved in the work of the TRC and had worked for human rights NGOs. 
During this time, Ngcuka said that he was unsure whether it was justified to dedicate state 
resources into chasing Apartheid era human rights abusers. But he said that in the interests 
of national reconciliation prosecutions should not be abandoned completely.59 Ngcuka 
acknowledged that he was obliged by the law to prosecute Apartheid-era crimes and would 
do so where he had enough evidence, but, by the same token, he was concerned about 
pursuing perpetrators of gross human rights violations with resources meant to combat 
other crimes. He added that the HRIU had studied the TRC Report and had identified cases 
that it could pursue, but at that stage, he could not say whether they would be able to 
gather enough evidence to prosecute such cases.60 In short, while the NPA acknowledged its 
duty to prosecute human rights violators, it was hesitant to do so. 
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  Bubenzer (2009) 24. 
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  Bubenzer (2009) 24. 
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  This is a view that has been expressed a number of South Africans including former Human Rights 
Commissioner Barney Pityana. 
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  ‘Ngcuka not sure if TRC cases worth cost’ IOL available at http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-
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Some of the cases before the HRIU were high-profile cases, including those of persons 
implicated in the murder of Steve Biko,61 who was tortured in police custody and later died 
as a result in 1977.62 The TRC had rejected five applications for amnesty that had been made 
in connection with Biko’s death.63 Saldanha said that nobody was charged because there 
were complexities relating to the case. The NPA, on the other hand, said that there was not 
enough evidence to sustain a prosecution, as it could not prove the charges relating to the 
murder, apart from the fact that one other charge had since prescribed. It stated 
furthermore that many of the other cases were still at that time being handled by the 
Amnesty Commission and needed meticulous preparation.64 
Thereafter, the cases were handed over to a unit called the Special National Projects Unit, 
which was a part of the Scorpions, headed by Advocate Chris Macadam. Macadam 
considered the amnesty proceedings a barrier to prosecutions, with the result that no 
prosecutions were instituted. 65 The NPA claimed that it did not want to commit resources 
to cases that had the risk of potential collapse due to amnesty applications. This is despite 
the fact that D’Oliveira had prepared about 20 charge sheets, and a number of them were 
significantly potential cases which did not have amnesty applications pending, such as the 
case of General Krappies Engelbrecht,66 who was the former commander of Eugene de Kock 
who was attached to the counter-insurgency unit headquartered at a farm called 
                                                          
61
  Stephen Bantu Biko was a popular political activist and founder of the Black Consciousness Movement.  
62
  See TRC Report vol 2 Chap 3 paras 184-5; TRC Report vol. 4 Chap. 5 para 12; TRC Report vol. 3 chap. 2 
para. 120. 
63
  Decision no. AC/99/0020. See Bubenzer (2009) 214, note 166.  
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  Bubenzer (2009) 214. 
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   Bubenzer (2009) 26. 
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  General Krappies Engelbrecht was the commanding officer of Brixton murder and robbery unit. At the 
trial of Eugene De Kock, Engelbrecht was accused by De Kock of being involved in a Vlakplaas operation 
that resulted in the death of Sam Chandi, his wife and three sons in Botswana. Engelbrecht denied the 
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Vlakplaas.67 According to Macadam, the second reason for failure to institute proceedings 
was that the NPA was waiting for the public release of the final volumes of the TRC Report, 
although the TRC had already strongly recommended that prosecutions be pursued. 68   
2.1.2. The Priority Crimes Litigation Unit (PCLU) 
After the tabling of the final two volumes of the TRC report in Parliament, the then 
President Mbeki stated in a speech that it was up to the NDPP to act on the cases that they 
deemed prosecutable.69 In 1999, a special unit within the NPA was established to determine 
which of the individuals who had not been granted amnesty should be prosecuted. The 
Special National Projects Unit was later restructured and renamed the Priority Crimes 
Litigation Unit (PCLU) in 2003.70  Advocate Anton Ackerman was appointed Special Director 
of Public Prosecutions and the head of the newly created PCLU. 71 The responsibility for 
post-TRC prosecutions was transferred to this unit.  
The mandate of the PCLU was to manage and direct the investigation and prosecution of 
crimes dealt with under the Rome Statute which, in the meantime, had been incorporated 
into South African domestic law.72 The crimes included acts of terrorism and sabotage, high 
treason, sedition, mercenary activities and other priority crimes to be determined by the 
NDPP. These were determined to be serious national and international crimes.73 The PCLU 
was not an investigative agency and depended, therefore, on the South African Police 
Services (SAPS) and the DSO to conduct the investigations. It also accepted the guidelines of 
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  Bubenzer (2009) 27. 
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  Bubenzer (2009) 27. 
69
   President Thabo Mbeki ‘Statement to the National houses of Parliament and the Nation, at the Tabling 
of the Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ April 15, 2003. See Gianini et al. (2009) 51. 
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   Sarkin J Carrots and Sticks: The TRC and the South African Amnesty Process Intersentia (2004) 375. 
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the DSO that only serious human rights violations should be prosecuted, taking into account 
humanitarian considerations and the interests of reconciliation. A total of 167 investigations 
were opened but only a small number of those were identified as being prosecutable.74 The 
total number of high priority prosecutable cases was reduced to about 16. 
The PCLU focused on the cases in which amnesty had been denied, with priority being given 
to cases involving egregious violations of human rights and which resulted in death. Those 
involving lesser degrees of egregiousness were of secondary priority.75 For the sake of 
credibility, it was important that the approach taken by the unit be strictly dependent on 
the evidence of how abhorrent the crime was regardless of the political affiliation of the 
perpetrator.76 However, the PCLU was under-resourced personnel-wise, as it was also 
tasked with other investigations, such as those concerning trafficking of nuclear weapons. In 
fact, the TRC prosecutions constituted 30 to 50 per cent of the PCLU investigations.77 It is 
not particularly clear why the government elected to overburden the PCLU with priority 
crimes of such a great magnitude as trafficking of nuclear weapons, as it surely could be 
foreseen that there would be competition for resources. This can be seen as evidence of a 
wavering political will to pursue seriously post-TRC prosecutions.  
2.1.3. The National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) 
The National Prosecuting Authority was created under the Constitution of 1996.78 The South 
African prosecution service was thus unified under one national prosecuting authority, 
headed by a National Director of Public Prosecutions, with “the power to institute criminal 
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proceedings on behalf of the state, and to carry out any necessary function incidental to 
instituting criminal proceedings”.79 The NDPP has the authority to determine the 
prosecution policies of the country in consultation with the Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development.80  
The NDPP has discretionary powers whether or not to pursue a prosecution after taking 
representations from the accused, the complainant and any other relevant parties.81 This 
discretion also comes with a direction from the Constitution that the NPA carry out its work 
“without fear, favour or prejudice”.82 The Constitutional Court in S v Basson83 held that the 
NPA was a representative of the community and has the responsibility to prosecute 
Apartheid-era crimes. This responsibility stems from the international obligation to 
prosecute crimes against humanity and war crimes, which were clearly perpetrated by the 
Apartheid government.84 The prosecution system of South Africa, like in many other 
common law states, is based upon the principle of expediency which gives the prosecutor 
the discretion to decide which cases to prosecute. The overarching consideration is whether 
it would be in the public interest to pursue such prosecution.85 
When the TRC processes had finally concluded and the final two volumes of the report had 
been released, President Mbeki said in a speech to parliament that there was no room for 
yet another amnesty process and that the only way to move forward was for the NDPP to 
conduct prosecutions as a matter of normal practice, using its discretion to determine which 
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prosecutions were worth pursuing.86 In his speech Mbeki alluded to the fact that the 
prosecutions of Apartheid crimes would be conducted in a similar way to ordinary crimes 
that came before the NPA, meaning that they would follow the same criminal procedures, 
followed in other cases and would also be subject to the process of plea bargaining where 
the prosecutor considered this appropriate.87 Mbeki’s speech was an early indication that 
the government and the NPA were more in favour of expediency than relentless 
prosecutions. It is, however, unclear why prosecutions that were so crucial to the 
transitional process were made to appear so incidental to the criminal justice process, to the 
extent that they were relegated to the fringes of criminal justice. Towards the end of 2004, 
the NPA’s prosecution policy was amended, with the NPA placing a moratorium on 
investigations and prosecutions of Apartheid crimes. This had the effect of precluding 
permanently certain cases from being prosecuted because many of them would be subject 
to prescription88 during the moratorium, making them ineligible for prosecution after the 
moratorium was lifted.89 Murder is not subject to prescription but other crimes such as the 
various forms of assault and crimes against the person are. 
 The guidelines were approved in December 2005 but were met with great criticism from 
civil society. The main criticism to the amended prosecution was that the NDPP’s 
discretionary power to enter into plea bargains with the accused was not dissimilar to the 
amnesty process.90 Civil society was of the view that the amended policy amounted to a 
repeat of the TRC process - a view that led ultimately to a constitutional challenge of the 
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amendments in the case of Nkadimeng and others v National Director of Public Prosecutions 
and others, which is discussed below.91  
The amended policy is an appendix to the original policy and begins with an outline of the 
context of and background to the adoption of the policy. It states that it would be 
undesirable to have a continuation of the amnesty process because that would amount to a 
violation of the constitutional rights of the victims to justice, and would go against the 
objectives of the TRC process.92 This section of the policy refers to existing legislation, such 
as the Criminal Procedure Act,93 which gives anyone an opportunity to enter into a plea 
agreement with the state in accordance with the ordinary prosecuting mandate of the 
NPA.94  This plea agreement is available to anyone who wished to make any disclosures 
about the conflicts of the past, and if the court is of the opinion that the testimony on behalf 
of the State against the accused person’s co-conspirators is satisfactory, then it may grant 
indemnity from prosecution.95 In the case of Apartheid-crimes, a person may enter into a 
mutually accepted guilty plea and sentence agreement.96 
Ngcuka’s successor, Vusi Pikoli, emphasised that the amended policy came into force to give 
effect to Mbeki’s speech in 2003. He also emphasised that the plea bargains were not a 
continuation of the TRC amnesty process because the opportunity still existed for interested 
parties to initiate private prosecutions or civil proceedings where the NPA declined to 
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  Nkadimeng and others v National Director of Public Prosecution and others Case No. 32709/07 (2008) 
TPD. 
92
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prosecute.97 The amended policy was presented by the NPA as a way to gain previously 
unknown truths about the past. There was strong opposition to the amendments, especially 
with regard to the claim that the discretion not to prosecute still gave victims the option of 
instituting private prosecutions. This is problematic because, although in theory private 
prosecutions are possible, in practice they are hardly obtainable because they are 
expensive, which in effect means, that the NDPP’s decision not to prosecute is for all intents 
and purposes the end of the matter.  
2.1.4. The case of Nokuthula Simelane: Nkadimeng v NDPP 
In 2008, Thembisile Nkadimeng, the sister of Nokuthula Simelane, together with the widows 
of so called ‘Cradock Four’, brought a challenge in the Pretoria High Court in the case of 
Nkadimeng v the National Director of Public Prosecutions. The applicants were challenging 
the policy amendments to the prosecution policy on the grounds that they introduced a 
form of indemnity from prosecution, which violated the Constitution as it infringes on the 
rule of the law and is in violation of international law.98  
2.1.4.1. Background   
During the TRC process, the Amnesty Committee received eight applications in connection 
with the death of Nokuthula Simelani, a former ANC cadre who disappeared in 1983 after 
being brutally tortured by Apartheid-era security forces. The Amnesty Committee found 
strong indicators that parts of the testimonies of the amnesty applicants were false and 
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accordingly, they were refused amnesty for torturing her but granted amnesty for abducting 
her.99  
The PCLU said that the case was being considered for prosecution, pending the amnesty 
hearings. But the NPA did not take the case further when the applicants were denied 
amnesty in 2001. The prospects for a successful prosecution now appear to be limited due 
to the period of prescription set out in Section 18 of the Criminal Procedure Act. Before 
2013, South Africa did not have a national anti-torture law,100 which meant that charges 
could be brought only under the common law crime of assault, which prescribed in 
September 2003. Furthermore, there could be no prosecution for kidnapping as all of the 
policemen were granted amnesty for her abduction. Finally, there appears to be no real 
prospects of successful prosecution on the charge of murder either because of a lack of 
evidence.101  
2.1.4.2. The legal challenge  
The issues raised in the case were whether or not the policy amendments had the effect of 
allowing for an amnesty, indemnity or a re-run of the TRC process,102 as the applicants 
argued, for even though the option ofprivate prosecutions exists, they are expensive. The 
respondents argued that the policy amendments recognise that it would be unconstitutional 
to continue the TRC process and that it is not the intention of the NDPP to do so. 
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Furthermore, the NDPP does not have the authority to grant amnesties, therefore if he 
decides not to prosecute then damages claims could still be instituted at civil law.103 
Judge Francis Legodi held that the policy amendments could be used to grant amnesty, even 
though the respondents argued that that is not the intention behind the amendments. He 
noted that it would be undesirable to have a law which did not correctly reflect the 
intention of the drafters.104 The court held that the amendments would allow the NPA to 
decline to prosecute a case, even where there was enough evidence to sustain a 
prosecution because of the wide discretion enjoyed by the NPA. He said that would violate 
the NPA’s constitutional obligation to ensure that those who have committed crimes are 
prosecuted for the crimes. Finally, the court held that the amendments did in effect amount 
to a ‘copycat’ of the TRC amnesty conditions105 and that the amended guidelines were not 
relevant to the decision of whether or not to prosecute.106 
The High Court dismissed an application by the NDPP and the Minister of Justice for leave to 
appeal the ruling. Although the respondents could still file a special plea to appeal to the 
Supreme Court of Appeal or apply for direct access to the Constitutional Court, this 
judgment confirms that there still exists an obligation on the NPA to conduct post-TRC 
prosecutions.107 What is uncertain, however, is what the practical implications of this 
obligation will entail.  
Since the early 1990s, when negotiations began about the transition to democracy, the 
question of prosecutions has always been a hotly debated issue. It was also evident that the 
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TRC was accepted as the best thing for that period of the transition, but that acceptance 
was based on the understanding that justice would be served also. As the special units 
evolved over the past two decades, the prospects of prosecutions going ahead have faded, 
mainly because of the government’s lack of political will. 
 Archbishop Desmond Tutu stated that justice cannot be achieved effectively without the 
prosecutions, and that should the prosecutions be abandoned, a culture of impunity would 
be fostered and undermine the rule of law.108 He warned against the introduction of any 
further mechanisms that would result in blanket amnesties. 109 Former Deputy Chairperson 
of the TRC, Alex Boraine, is also critical of the government as he accused the NPA in 2006 of 
dragging its feet in the prosecutions of those denied amnesty.110  
2.2. The Latin American Narrative 
2.2.1. Argentina 
By the end of 1982, Argentina was on the cusp of a revolution. The military regime was at its 
weakest as it had just lost the battle against the British for the Malvinas (the Falkland 
Islands) and the country was in the midst of an economic crisis. The people were calling for 
free and fair elections that would usher them into a new democracy based on respect for 
human rights.  
At the forefront of the elections were two presidential candidates who held very different 
views about what was supposed to be done about perpetrators of gross human rights 
violations. The Peronist Party candidate was Italo Luder who held the view that it would be 
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constitutionally impossible for carry out trials because the amnesty laws enacted by the 
previous regime could not be repealed. The Radical Party candidate, Raúl Alfosín, promised 
that he would ensure that investigations into the human rights abuses were conducted and 
that there would be trials held for those who were responsible for the abduction, torture 
and killings of what the prior dictatorship had called “subversives”.111 He promised that the 
trials would include the military chiefs who were presumably responsible for ordering the 
crimes, the officers who had acted beyond the scope of their duties regardless of the 
positions of authority they occupied, and guerrilla leaders who were responsible for the 
gross human rights violations. He intended the trials to exclude the people were acting 
under orders.112 
Alfosín won the presidential elections and assumed power 40 days later. Upon taking office, 
he announced the measures that he intended to take to ensure that there would be a 
respect for human rights. He sent to the Congress of Argentina a number of draft bills which 
were subsequently approved. The bills were designed to repeal the draconian laws that had 
been enacted by the previous regime,113 to punish the crime of torture with the same 
penalty as that for murder,114 and to ratify all the relevant international and regional human 
rights covenants.115 Alfosín considered it necessary to set a time limit to run the trials as 
well as a limit on the scope of accountability because that would ensure that the trials were 
done effectively and were seen through to completion. These limits were necessary because 
the resistance within the military which still had the monopoly on state coercion and were 
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united in opposition. The time limits envisaged by Alfosín were therefore necessary to 
protect the democratic system.116  
2.2.1.1. Obstacles to Prosecutions   
There were three major obstacles to limiting the time-frame and the scope of the trials. The 
first obstacle was the principle of non-retrospective application of the law which Congress 
overcame by declaring the laws null and void rather than abrogating them. It declared that 
laws were only valid if they were just.117  
The second obstacle was that military jurisdiction had been established by the military 
court. This was problematic because the impartiality of the courts was not guaranteed; 
however, ex post facto loss of a court’s jurisdiction was unconstitutional.118 A compromise 
was agreed upon according to which the military courts could exercise jurisdiction as a court 
of first instance, but that there would be an automatic appeal to the federal court where 
new evidence could be introduced. Secondly, the military court would be given six months 
to conclude the trials, whereafter the time could be extended. The government made these 
decisions under the misguided assumption that the military judges would be willing to 
prosecute as a means of purging the military of those people who brought it to disrepute. 
Secondly, the government hoped that the military court would dispose of the cases quickly  
because only  few would be prosecuted. This assumption was wrong, for the military courts 
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failed to conduct proper trials by rejecting cases erroneously. The government thereafter 
decided that the federal court could hear those cases.119   
The third obstacle was the regulation of the criminal law defence of due obedience.120 This 
defence was undesirable because it allowed for many mid-level officials to escape 
punishment. 121 Alfosín sent a draft bill to Congress, presenting a revocable presumption 
that the officials who had committed crimes under orders, and without decision-making 
capacity, had acted under the mistake that the orders were legitimate. This phrasing meant 
that only those who had given the orders, those who had followed orders but had sufficient 
discretion not to comply with the orders, and those who had committed extraordinary 
brutal violations of human rights were to be prosecuted. This meant that even though there 
would be a number of officers who could use the defence of following orders, the number 
would be greatly reduced by the presumption, particularly in the case of those officers who 
had followed orders but committed extraordinarily brutal crimes. The phrasing struck a 
balance between the outrageous literal interpretation of the law that would have awarded 
immunity to everyone except members of the junta, and the excessively harsh 
interpretation that would have required every accused person to prove positively that he 
had been led to believe that the order was legitimate.122  
This presumption was amended to exclude crimes considered to be abhorrent and 
atrocious, although the crimes were not defined. As this caused confusion, it was decided 
that the scope would be limited through an application of ordinary military court processes. 
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123 The military courts, however, failed to conduct trials within the allotted six months, 
including the extension. The Federal Court of Buenos Aires then assumed jurisdiction and 
conducted trials, as opposed to the  federal courts of the interior that were very slow in 
assuming  jurisdiction and concluding cases. In the end, the safeguards that Alfosín had felt 
were necessary to protect the democratic system were not closely followed, mostly due to 
the unco-ordinated participation of Congress and the courts.  
As the military increasingly became intolerant of the trials, which they said were targeting 
them, they threatened to revolt. In December of 1986 Alfosín sent a proposal to Congress to 
enact what is commonly referred to as the “full stop” laws which, although heavily criticised, 
led to the rejuvenation of the courts and resulted in the indictment of 450 people. This law 
gave the courts 60 days within which to indict the military men involved. The military 
resisted citation and the Supreme Court failed to take responsibility for defining the limits of 
due obedience. Furthermore, the decision resulted in a rebellion by a military group known 
as the ‘painted faces’. Frantic and heated discussions within the government ensued. The 
government then enacted  a law that provided that the revocable presumption of due 
obedience was now irrevocable. 124 This law defined which military ranks held decision-
making powers and excluded the exception of abhorrent and atrocious acts for all other 
military ranks.  
Human rights organisations, journalists and academics criticised the law strongly, with the 
result that the government lost support, as evidenced by poor performances in the 
parliamentary and provincial election of September 1987.125 But  when the ‘painted faces’ 
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attempted another rebellion, they were repressed immediately by the bulk of the military, 
which had now expressed its clear support for the democratic institutions.  
Alfosín also regained favour with both houses of Congress by announcing that there would 
be no more limitations on the trials. This favour and success of the government, however, 
was short-lived and clouded by a terrorist attempt on garrison La Tablada in January of 
1989, and by hyperinflation which exploded from February 1989 onward. The Radical Party 
lost the presidential elections in May of 1989 and Alfosín resigned from his presidency 
before the end of his term, as he realised that only a newly-elected government would be 
able to contain the socio-economic crisis.126 When Carlos Menem of the Peronist Party 
succeeded Alfonsin in July 1989, he pardoned all the people who had been convicted or 
were being tried for state or subversive terrorism, for misconduct in the war, and for 
rebelling against democratic institution.127 The pardons extended to those who were 
responsible for organising the campaign of terror.128  
Alfonsin’s efforts in pressing for prosecutions represent a great success for justice in 
Argentina. He recognised that successful transition from a repressive government to a 
democratic one needs a strong political will to be achieved.  At the beginning of the 
transition, Argentina had limited options on how best to deal with crimes committed during 
the repression, but doing nothing was not an option. Alfonsin’s government did not view the 
success of the Truth Commission as an indication that the transition had been completed, 
but rather used the process to build an ethos of respect for human rights. It made all the 
efforts to ensure that the Truth Commission be not seen as merely a compromise of justice 
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for truth. The efforts to conduct trials became the major building blocks for the 
establishment of the rule of law in Argentina. 
2.2.2. Chile 
2.2.2.1. The arrest and detention of Augusto Pinochet 
The arrest and detention of General Augusto Pinochet in London in 1988 was one of the 
most significant events in international law. During his dictatorship that lasted 17 years, 
Pinochet was responsible for the death or forcible removal of some 3 196 people.129 The 
Pinochet case is significant because although it did not end in a prosecution of the former 
dictator, it acted as a catalyst for lasting political and legal change in Chile and the rest of 
Latin America.130 
Pinochet was arrested by British police on charges of terrorism, torture and genocide. His 
arrest warrant was issued by Spanish magistrate Baltasar Garzón, whose complaint was 
based on the principle of universal jurisdiction for crimes against humanity. Essentially, 
although Garzón’s claim was also in respect of a number of Spanish victims, the majority of 
the victims were Chilean. Between 1998 and 1999 the British courts heard the applications 
for extradition of Pinochet and ruled that he did not enjoy immunity from prosecution for 
his crimes and therefore could be extradited to Spain. Members of the Chilean government 
and the opponents to extradition urged the British government to send Pinochet back to 
Chile on medical grounds. In 2002, Pinochet was returned to Chile.131  
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2.2.2.2. The Pinochet effect 
Before Pinochet was arrested in London, the prospects of prosecuting him in Chile were 
impossible as he was protected by the amnesty laws. Furthermore, he had enjoyed 
parliamentary immunity by virtue of his position as senator for life, even after his 
senatorship, and even though he was no longer the president. In 2000, the Chilean Congress 
provided yet another layer of protection, this time granting all former presidents of Chile 
immunity from prosecution. This step represented a concerted effort to prevent 
prosecutions and to uphold impunity.132  
There was a major shift in the attention given to human rights issues during the 16 months 
that Pinochet had been detained. Victims had now been given a new voice, as the 
international community considered Pinochet to be a criminal. Although a number of 
charges had been brought against Pinochet in Chile, his detention emboldened victims to 
pursue the prosecution of the former dictator. By the end of 2003, some 300 charges had 
been brought against him. Added to this, judicial reforms in the 1990s resulted in the 
Pinochet-appointed judges being replaced by judges sworn to upholding human rights, 
thereby allowing courts to re-interpret the amnesty laws. Chilean judge Juan Guzmán was 
one of the first judges to uphold the new interpretation of the amnesty laws and upon 
Pinochet’s return, he got the  Congress to strip Pinochet of his parliamentary immunity. 
Pinochet was then indicted and placed under house arrest for his role in the so-called 
‘Caravan Deaths’  in which 70 of his political opponents were killed. Pinochet never had his 
day in court as he died before he could stand trial.133 
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The detention of Pinochet had the effect of paving the way for prosecutions of other 
military officials. Prior to his arrest there had been only a few successful prosecutions of 
officials who fell explicitly outside the scope of the amnesty laws. By the end of 2003, there 
were more than 300 indictments of military officers and many of them had already been 
convicted for the disappearances of persons under Pinochet’s rule. Furthermore, there were 
judges appointed to deal specifically with human rights abuses, which resulted in further 
breakthroughs. Although many of the judgments handed down by the courts appeared to 
be contradictory, there is no doubt that Pinochet’s arrest had a major ripple effect on justice 
and an end of impunity, not only in Chile, but all over Latin America.134 This development is 
called the ‘Pinochet effect.’ 
Argentina is one of the countries that experienced the Pinochet effect. After Alfosín had 
stepped down from power and Menem had pardoned the military officers, victims were 
faced with a new obstacle. The victims joined the international human rights advocates who 
were filing cases against Argentinian human rights violators residing abroad in Italy, Sweden, 
Germany, France, and Spain. This was not an easy task as extradition requests from Spain 
and other foreign countries were not readily accepted by the Menem administration or by 
his successor, Fernando De La Rúa.  However, in the meantime the Spanish judge, Garzón, 
had been investigating human rights abuses in Argentina as well, and he was the one who 
issued the warrant for the arrest of the Argentinian naval officer Miguel Cavallo, who was 
living in Mexico. And a Mexican court ruled in favour of Cavallo’s extradition in 2003. Unlike 
his predecessors, newly elected Argentine President Nestor Kirchner did nothing to oppose 
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extradition and refused to provide Cavallo with legal assistance, stating that “the Argentine 
State does not defend delinquents”. 135 
The arrest of Pinochet added momentum to the existing movement of investigating and 
prosecuting members of the military who had not been covered by the amnesty laws. The 
movement against impunity caused the Argentine judge, Rodolfo Canicoba, to act on the 
arrest warrants of Garzón and to order the arrests of 45 military officers and one civilian 
charged with terrorism, genocide and torture.  The unprecedented move by Canicoba was 
met with an even bolder move by President Kirchner who repealed De La Rua’s 2001 decree 
that had prevented the extradition of former military officers. Perhaps most telling of all 
was the annulment of the amnesty laws by the Argentinian government in 2003, and the 
enactment of additional legislation that would facilitate the prosecution of crimes against 
humanity. These developments sent clear messages that judges and prosecutors were 
encouraged to open and re-open cases and question the constitutionality of the amnesty 
laws.136   
Because of the work that had been done by Alfosín’s administration, the demand for a 
respect of human rights had been cemented as a fundamental tool to end impunity and 
promote the rule of law. This can clearly be seen in the refusal of the people to accept 
inactivity on the part of government. When they felt they had no recourse domestically, 
they joined the international community to pursue international prosecutions. 
A very important lesson that should be learned from Chile is that the movement against 
impunity did not begin with the arrest of Pinochet, but rather it was a culmination of nearly 
three decades of persistent efforts aimed at cultivating respect for human rights and the 
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pursuit of justice. Furthermore, it is equally important to realise that just as the movements 
did not begin with his arrest in London, they also did not end with Pinochet’s release. What 
the arrest of Pinochet did for Chile, Argentina and other countries in Latin America was to 
establish respect for the rule of law and show that there is no place for impunity, even if it 
means pursuing  justice decades after the fact.  
2.3. Conclusion 
In South Africa, the foundation built by the TRC was not complemented by any serious 
attempts to pursue justice, even when the people demanded it. In a purely comparative 
exercise, at the point of transition, the obstacles that faced Argentina were direr than those 
faced by South Africa. Argentina was constantly threatened by military rebellion and the 
amnesty laws could not be simply repealed, whereas South Africa had managed a successful 
and peaceful transition to democracy, and had negotiated relatively fair amnesty conditions. 
It is imaginable that if Argentina could manage prosecutions, South Africa could, too.  
On the other hand, in the event that the political status of South Africa was not as stable in 
practice as it appeared to be in theory, the lessons from Chile can be as important. The 
movement against impunity gained great momentum only after the arrest of Pinochet. It 
has been a little over 10 years since the final TRC report was submitted to former President 
Mbeki and the government has been lethargic. The effects of this listlessness are already 
beginning to show in the rapid deterioration of the rule of law and the endless delays in 
charging officials who are alleged to have been involved in corrupt practices, especially 
insofar as it relates to the awarding of public tenders. Chile teaches us that even with the 
passage of time, it can never be too late to take steps to seek justice.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
POLITICS AND THE NATIONAL PROSECUTING AUTHORITY OF SOUTH AFRICA 
3. Introduction 
One of the most important elements for a stable and democratic government is a firmly- 
established respect for the rule of law. The prosecution of crimes helps establish such 
respect. Whereas truth commissions may be regarded as a form of restorative justice, 
criminal prosecutions are retributive in nature.137 However, trials should not be seen as 
tools for revenge; rather, it is important that they be regarded as fulfilling also a social 
function, by which is meant that they serve not merely to  punish the perpetrator and thus 
make amends to the victim but, in addition, criminal trials help to nurture a culture of 
accountability. Pursuing retribution through legitimate prosecutions within the framework 
of the rule of law thus contributes to establishing and solidifying a political order that is 
based on the law.138 
Corruption runs contrary to a culture of accountability fundamentally, and it undermines 
the rule of law because it diminishes public trust in institutions of state and principles of 
good and accountable governance.139 
The consequences of the South African government’s political manipulation of the NPA to 
stall post-TRC prosecutions has resulted in a state of affairs where, in cases involving high-
level state officials, prosecutorial discretion is tailored to suit the whims of the executive 
arm of government. 
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3.1. The rise and fall of the ‘Scorpions’ 
In June 1999, former President Mbeki announced the establishment of the Directorate of 
Special Operations (the DSO, also known as the ‘Scorpions’). This unit was a well-resourced, 
multidisciplinary investigative team, equipped to investigate national priority crimes, 
including corruption within the South African Police Services.140 The Scorpions operated on 
the so-called troika principle, which was based on the adoption of a multidisciplinary 
strategy to combat organised crime in South Africa. In practice, the multidisciplinary team 
consisted of police investigators, prosecutors and crime data analysts.141  
This unit was established under Section 7 of the National Prosecuting Authority Act142 (NPA 
Act) and came into legal effect in 2001. The establishment of the ‘Scorpions' coincided with 
South Africa signing the United Nations International Convention against Transnational 
Organised Crime (UNCTOC)143 and the enactment of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 
(POCA).144 It appears from the drafting of POCA and the DSO enabling laws, that parliament 
had intended the ‘Scorpions’  to be the main tool for combating  racketeering and organised 
crime.145 
The ‘Scorpions’ came into being mainly  because of the low conviction rates in racketeering 
cases, as well as cases involving police corruption and other species of organised crime.146 
The ‘Scorpions’ had a staff totalling 536 people, drawn from the ranks of the country’s top 
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policemen and experts in the fields of forensic investigation. Some of the young recruits 
underwent specialised training in the US and UK.147 By February 2004, the ‘Scorpions’ had 
disposed of 653 cases, comprising 273 investigations and 380 prosecutions.148 Out of the 
380 prosecutions, 341 of them resulted in a conviction, which meant that it had an average 
conviction rate of 93, 1%.  
 Public confidence in the ‘Scorpions’ grew in proportion to the increasing number of high-
profile cases they investigated and which led to successful prosecutions. But the 
government felt uncomfortable when the ‘Scorpions’ started to investigate top politicians. 
In fact, shortly after they were established the ‘Scorpions’ said that they would investigate 
the infamous arms procurement process (hereafter ‘the arms deal’). The arms deal was 
valued at R43, 8 billion, and is said to have come about as a result of the alleged bribing of 
high-ranking members of the African National Congress (ANC), the governing political 
party.149 The members of the ANC were also government officials and included then Deputy 
President Jacob Zuma,150 former Minister of Transport Mac Maharaj,151 and businessman 
Schabir Schaik.152  
During the investigation into the arms deal in 2001, the ‘Scorpions’ discovered certain 
irregularities in connection with the awarding of tenders by the Department of Defence. 
Schabir Schaik was implicated in the dealings. He was prosecuted and was found guilty on 
two counts of corruption and one of fraud relating to his relationship with Jacob Zuma, 
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whose financial advisor and long-time confidante he was. In S v Schaik153 the court 
sentenced Schaik to 15 years’ imprisonment for contravening the Corruption Act, 94 of 
1992.  
Throughout the three-year-long trial, the relationship between Zuma and Schaik was called 
into question, but neither the state nor the defence called him to testify as a witness. This 
anomaly led to the media questioning why Zuma had not been charged together with 
Schaik. Upon Schaik’s conviction, Mbeki dismissed Zuma as the deputy president, resulting 
in political tension within the ANC. 
After the Schaik trial, in 2005, the ‘Scorpions’ raided Zuma’s home to search for evidence 
that could be used against him. These raids were criticised severely by the ANC- aligned 
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), saying that the Scorpions were becoming 
a law unto themselves.154 In the following year, the ‘Scorpions’ raided the offices of Zuma’s 
lawyers to find information that they could use as evidence against him in an anticipated 
corruption trial. Again, the raid elicited sharp criticism from the ANC. Zuma thereupon 
instituted legal action against the ‘Scorpions’, accusing it of having violated attorney-client 
privilege. The court upheld Zuma’s claim.155  
It was this investigation into  Zuma by the ‘Scorpions’ that led to the question whether or 
not the DSO was accountable and whether it was located rightly  within the NPA, or 
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whether it should be brought under the auspices  of  the South African Police Services.156 
Indeed, it is these events which led to the downfall of the ‘Scorpions’.157 
In 2008, the ANC hosted its 52nd national conference (commonly known as the Polokwane 
conference) where Mbeki was ousted as president of the ANC and replaced by Zuma. Small 
wonder that in 2009 Zuma, when he became president, signed into law amendments which 
disbanded the ‘Scorpions’, replacing them with the Directorate of Priority Crime 
Investigation (DPCI), the so-called ‘Hawks’.158 The latter were to be located within SAPS, in 
accordance with the resolution taken at the Polokwane conference.159 In the same year, 
Hugh Glenister, a South African businessman, brought an application in the Western Cape 
High Court, challenging the enactment of the two amendment laws. The court’s judgment 
became known as the Glenister I judgment.160 The challenge was unsuccessful and the Bills 
were enacted into law. 
 In 2011, Glenister brought another application (Glenister II) to the High Court, this time 
challenging the constitutional validity of the above-mentioned laws. This application, too, 
was unsuccessful, so Glenister appealed to the Constitutional Court, basing his appeal on 
the submission that the provisions violated Section 179 of the Constitution, which sets out 
the powers and functions of the NPA. He contended that, to disband the ‘Scorpions’ would 
undermine the independence of the NPA as provided for in Section 179(4) of the 
Constitution.161  
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The Constitutional Court held that parliament had not acted irrationally when enacting the 
impugned provisions, firstly because legislative authority rests with parliament, which is 
bound only by the Constitution in exercising its power. Secondly, the determination of 
whether or not a law is rational depends on the relationship between the schemes it takes 
and the legitimate governmental purpose it wants to achieve. 162 To survive the rationality 
test, the legislation does not have to be shown to be reasonable or appropriate.163 The court 
held also that the location within the SAPS was not in itself unconstitutional and the 
decision to disband the ‘Scorpions’ and to replace it with the ‘Hawks’ did not in itself offend 
the Constitution.164   
The court expressed the undeniable need for anti-corruption measures to be employed in 
South Africa because corruption undermines the democratic ethos of the country while 
threatening the rule of law. It held that when corruption and organised crime are allowed to 
flourish, this results in the deterioration of security and stability in the country, while also 
stunting sustainable development and economic growth. Furthermore, corruption fuels 
maladministration and public fraudulence, which results in the inability of the state to fulfil 
its obligations to respect, promote and fulfil the rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights.165  
3.2. The duty to establish an anti-corruption unit  
The applicants in Glenister II argued that there was a duty on the state to establish an anti-
corruption unit imposed by the Constitution and international law.  
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In their majority judgment, Moseneke DCJ and Cameron J held that the Constitution is the 
primal source for the duty of the state to fight corruption. The Constitution does not 
command expressly that a corruption-fighting unit should be established, nor does it 
prescribe operational and other attributes that must be established. However, the Court 
found that the state has a duty to establish an anti-corruption unit, as corruption disables 
the state from respecting, protecting, promoting and fulfilling rights as required by section 
7(2) of the Constitution. To combat corruption, the state is required to have an integrated 
and comprehensive response.166 
The Court found that the international instruments and conventions that South Africa has 
ratified impose a clear and unequivocal duty on the government to create an anti-
corruption unit that has the necessary independence. However, the Court noted that it 
would not be prescriptive as to what measures the state must take, as long as they are all 
within the range of possible conduct that a reasonable decision-maker in the circumstances 
would adopt. The Court held that to create an anti-corruption unit which is not adequately 
independent would not be determined to be reasonable and that the duty was 
constitutionally enforceable.167  
3.3. The operational and structural independence of the ‘Hawks’  
The applicants argued that the ‘Hawks’ lacked the necessary structural and operational 
independence to be an effective corruption-fighting unit, therefore, violating South Africa’s 
international obligations and the Constitution.168  
                                                          
166
  Glenister v President (2011) para 175. 
167
  Glenister v President (2012) para 175. 
168
  Section 233 of the Constitution (1996). 
 
 
 
 
47 
 
Ngcobo CJ, in the minority judgement, held that independence requires that the anti-
corruption agency be able to function effectively without undue influence from any and all 
political forces. It requires mechanisms to be put in place that will ensure that there is no 
interference with the chain of command of the unit, so that there is no undue influence on 
the operational decisions such as starting, continuing and ending criminal investigations and 
prosecutions involving corruption.169  
Moseneke DCJ and Cameron J held that the question that was to be asked was not whether 
or not the ‘Hawks’ have sufficient structural and operational autonomy to protect the unit 
from undue political influence, but rather whether the autonomy was secured through 
sufficient institutional and legal mechanisms.170 Additionally, a further criterion, namely, the 
perception of independence, was added by the court. It was added not to impose further 
obligations on parliament, but rather to build public confidence in the independence of the 
unit, which is an essential component. This is judged by the standard of a reasonable and 
informed member of the public who may have misgivings about the fact that the features 
protecting the ‘Hawks’ are markedly more tenuous than those protecting the ‘Scorpions’.171 
The court found that the provisions creating the ‘Hawks’ may be able to create a hedge 
around it, but fails to afford it an adequate measure of autonomy, as there is not sufficient 
insulation from undue political influence in its structure and functioning. For instance, 
conditions of service pertaining to the members of the unit and its head make them 
vulnerable to abuse. The statutory provisions of the ‘Hawks’ were considered comparatively 
against the regulated structure of the ‘Scorpions’ that preceded them. However, the court 
cautioned that the exercise should not be seen as being an application of a golden standard 
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from which parliament cannot deviate. The comparison should be aimed at revealing where 
the Hawks can be determined to be less independent than the ‘Scorpions0’.  
The Constitutional Court upheld the appeal and ruled that the amendment laws were 
unconstitutional. It gave parliament 18 months to remedy the defect. In the meantime, the 
‘Scorpions’ was disbanded and the ‘Hawks’ was established. 
3.4. Corruption and the independence of the NPA 
In 2009, the acting head of the NPA, Mokotedi Mpshe, made the announcement that the 
charges against Zuma would be dropped because there was a discovery of telephone 
recordings between former NDPP, Bulelani Ngcuka, and head of the ‘Scorpions’, Leonard 
McCarthy. The tapes were in the possession of President Zuma’s legal team, which made 
representations for the permanent stay of prosecution because the recordings allegedly 
showed evidence of political interference and abuse of power by Ngcuka and McCarthy. 
Mpshe stated that it was not so much the prosecution itself that was tainted, but rather the 
legal process. He said it was the hardest decision he has ever had to make and that it did not 
amount to an acquittal of Zuma.172  
While it can be conceded that the conversations between Ngcuka and McCarthy regarding 
the timing of the charges against Zuma may have been ethically problematic,173 Mpshe’s 
decision to drop the charges has been challenged by the official opposition party, the 
Democratic Alliance (DA). In their heads of argument to the legal challenge instituted in the 
Western Cape High Court, the DA submitted that his decision was irrational and unlawful, 
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stating that “the DA does not assert that Zuma is guilty, but only that he, like any other 
person, should face criminal charges when compelling evidence of wrongdoing exists. He 
too should be given the benefit of his day in court to challenge the allegations against him, 
even if he is anxious to avoid that prospect.”174 The submission in the DA’s heads of 
argument echo the sentiment of most South Africans who demand accountability and 
transparency in the government and the Prosecuting Authority.   
Charges against Zuma have irked him throughout his incumbency as president. The manner 
in which the various NDPPs have come into and left office, coupled with the widespread 
adverse public and media attention that the NPA has attracted, particularly in relation to 
how it has dealt with the corruption charges against Zuma, has compromised its 
independence.175 Although the charges against Zuma have been withdrawn, it does not 
mean that they cannot be re-instated at a later stage when he no longer enjoys personal 
immunity from prosecution before domestic courts, as incumbent president.  At the time of 
writing, Zuma is embroiled in a scandal relating to the R246 million upgrade of his rural 
private dwelling, Nkandla. The Public Protector, Thuli Madonsela, has investigated 
accusations of wrongdoing in respect of the upgrading and she found certain features in the 
upgrades to be ‘non-security’ features.176 She stated in her report, entitled Secure in 
Comfort, that “the President tacitly accepted the implementation of all measures at his 
residence and has unduly benefitted from the capital investment from the non-security 
installations.  A reasonable part of the expenditure should be borne by him and his family.” 
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The non-security measures include a swimming pool, a fowl run, a cattle kraal and an 
amphitheatre. 177  
An ANC investigation into the upgrade, headed by the Minister of Police, Nhleko, found that 
Zuma is not liable for paying back the money spent on his homestead and that the much- 
criticised swimming pool was in fact not a swimming pool, but an emergency ‘fire pool’ or 
‘open water source’ that can be used to extinguish fires that can erupt from the flammable 
thatched huts.178 
The controversy has sparked outrage amongst citizens and has resulted in chaotic scenes in 
Parliament, occasioned by persistent interjection and heckling by one of the opposition 
parties, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), demanding that Zuma pay back the money as 
recommended by the Public Protector. The EFF has taken the matter to the Constitutional 
Court, for it to decide whether Zuma should indeed pay back the money. Although this may 
be a step forward for democracy, it is unclear whether the Constitutional Court’s judgement 
will be adhered to given that, at the time of writing, the Glenister II judgment has yet to be 
obeyed.179  
The Public Protector has submitted an affidavit to the Constitutional Court to join in the EFF 
case, either as a respondent or amicus curiae, on the basis that the Court’s decision will 
have a bearing on her powers in all other matters. The Public Protector’s participation as an 
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interested party in the Constitutional Court case follows from a Western Cape High Court 
judgment in October 2014, according to which the Public Protector’s recommendations are 
not binding and enforceable. The Public Protector maintains that the Western Cape High 
Court decision has set a precedent which has caused politicians and organs of state to 
disregard her recommendations.180  According to Zuma, “recommendations are 
recommendations, [they] are not verdicts, subject to be taken or not taken if they are 
recommendations, it is only a judge verdict [sic] that you have got to either go to prison or 
pay the money [sic].”181  
3.5. Conclusion 
The events described might appear as exceptions or isolated instances of political 
interference with state institutions that derive their powers to make independent decisions 
from the Constitution. The trouble is that these exceptions become the rule if they are 
allowed to continue to happen. This blatant disregard for the law, if not halted, is bound to 
spawn a culture of impunity within the higher echelons of government, giving rise to a state 
of affairs where the rule of law and the notion of being accountable to the law are 
jettisoned for selfish interests. Where the law is disregarded, corruption thrives.  While the 
connection between corruption and human rights might not seem apparent, in practice the 
diversion of funds otherwise meant for the fulfilment of socio-economic rights has a 
devastating effect on the lives of the underprivileged in particular, the very sector of society 
that simply cannot afford to pay bribes in order to give effect to their rights to housing, 
education, health, sanitation, or to obtain civic documents.  
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The next chapter discusses the need to maintain the rule of law and the notion of 
accountability in the context of the theme of this paper. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE RULE OF LAW AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
4. Introduction  
The value of trials for human rights violations in countries emerging from repressive regimes 
has been a subject of great debate amongst transitional justice scholars.182 Samuel 
Huttington has argued that trials should not be pursued because they could destroy the 
necessary foundations for democracy, but if they are pursued, they should be carried out at 
the beginning of a transition.183 O’Donnell and Schmitter have admitted that in the case of 
very gross human rights violations, trials might be necessary, but they are pessimistic about 
the effect that the trials might have on democracy.184 They conclude that “if civilian 
politicians use courage and skill, it may not necessarily be suicidal for a nascent democracy 
to confront the most reprehensible facts of its recent past”.185 This paper has argued that 
human rights trials – post-TRC trials in particular – are essential for creating a democracy 
founded on  respect for the rule of law. 
4.1. The importance of the rule of law 
The rule of law is a political ideal that exists within a political system but it must not be 
confused with other political ideals such as democracy, justice, equality, human rights and 
human dignity.186 It is the combination of these ideals that creates an effective and 
functioning society. In its broadest definition, the rule of law means that “people should 
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obey the law and be ruled by it”.187 In the political and legal sense, its definition is narrowed 
to mean that government shall be ruled by the law and be subject to it. This ideal is 
commonly expressed by the phrase “government by law and not by men”.188  
Raz identifies principles that can be derived as characteristics of the rule of law, noting that 
the list is not exhaustive and that the circumstances of the different societies will play a role 
in their validity or importance. The principles include: (1) the making of particular laws 
(particularly legal orders) should be guided by open, stable, clear, and general rules; (2) the 
independence of the judiciary should be guaranteed; and (3) the discretion of the crime-
preventing agencies should be not be allowed to pervert the law.189 Whether or not a 
country adheres to the rule of law can be measured by the level of accountability for the 
commission of crime.  
4.2. Accountability 
Chapter Three showed a very clear lack of accountability in South Africa for acts of 
corruption within the highest echelons of government. It thus supports the philosophical 
basis of this study which was that if public officials saw that there was no punishment for 
gross human rights violations, nothing or very little would deter them from committing 
“mere” economic crimes.190 Chapter Three traced also the rise and fall of the specialised 
anti-corruption unit, the ‘Scorpions’, the political manipulation of the NPA, and the 
corruption scandal surrounding the private home of Zuma. It drew the conclusion that these 
symptoms are an early indication of the erosion of the rule of law, as corruption eats away 
at the fabric of democracy. The comparative lack of accountability by high state officials in 
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South Africa can be attributed in part to the lack of post-TRC prosecutions because, as will 
be shown below, Argentina and Chile have fared better in the creation of a human rights 
culture and a system of accountability as a result of pursuing post-TRC prosecutions. 
4.2.1. Argentina 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s most of the transition states in Latin America were 
focused mainly on holding competitive elections. Argentina was faced with the challenge of 
having free elections before it could establish independent courts to hold state actors 
accountable. 191  This proved to be the biggest challenge to the institution of prosecutions in 
the early stages of the transition.192 
Where Argentina was lacking in criminal prosecutions, the international community made 
up by exercising universal jurisdiction as, for example, the case of the naval officer, Cavallo, 
who was arrested in Mexico.193 Not only did the trials conducted outside Argentina promote 
justice, they encourage human rights activists, too, to have recourse to international courts 
where they were frustrated by domestic laws that hampered the institution of prosecutions. 
Argentinian human rights activists thereupon sought the assistance of Spain, Italy and 
Germany when the Menem government passed a law which gave previous gross human 
rights violators’ total amnesty from prosecutions. This amnesty served only to galvanise 
human rights activists to pursue prosecutions relentlessly. They simply refused to accept 
impunity, and mobilised civil society to call for the accountability to the law that former 
President Alfonsín had initiated.194 In 2003, the Supreme Court held the amnesty laws to be 
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unconstitutional, as a result of which the courts struck down the pardons given to former 
dictatorship officials convicted or facing trial. By August 2014, 121 prosecutions had been 
held against former state officials for crimes against humanity originating from the 
dictatorship, resulting in 503 convictions.195 
After the dictatorship, Argentina established an anti-corruption office which is regarded as 
‘an agency that seems clearly devoted, against great odds, to bring some transparency and 
accountability into government.   In the very cynical climate that dominates Argentina 
today, such good standing is quite remarkable”.196 
All of the above in no way suggests that Argentina does not face continuing problems of 
corruption, police abuse of power, extremely bad prison conditions and access to justice for 
the indigenous population. It does have such problems, but does not shy away from them. 
On the international scene, Argentina is a champion of human rights and has played a 
leading role in sponsoring several human rights initiatives.197 
4.2.2. Chile   
Chile has also been influenced much  by the international community in promoting human 
rights, and it is also regarded as having one of the lowest levels of corruption in Latin 
America.198 However, like Argentina, it is not immune to corruption. In the 1990s, 
corruption at the municipal level in the form of patronage was widespread, resulting in 241 
corruption-related charges reported between 1993 and 1994. In 2002 and 2003, it was 
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confronted with one of the biggest corruption scandals it had faced since the beginning of 
the Latin American re-democratization period, which garnered much media and political 
attention.199  
Anti-corruption reforms throughout the re-democratization period were exceedingly 
partisan in that there was no uniform governmental strategy to combat corruption. 
However, after the widely-publicised 2003 corruption scandals, there was a consensus in 
government over the need for reform.200 In 2002 and 2003 the ruling coalition, the 
Concertación, was involved in a number of bribery scandals involving members of 
parliament and three government officials who were accused of having received bribes for 
the allocation of licences for vehicle-refitting plants in the state of Rancagua. The case had 
an immediate effect on the balance of power in the House of Deputies, as the six deputies 
had their parliamentary powers stripped in November 2002. Eventually, three participants 
were declared ineligible to hold public position for a period of six years and were found 
guilty by  a court, which sentenced them to a suspended 50 days’ imprisonment. 201   
In response to the scandals the government implemented a package of 49 reform measures 
in 2003. These included slashing the number of patronage jobs from 3000 to 600.202 Chile’s 
quick response to the scandal shows that the government was serious about combating 
corruption and about holding violators of the law accountable. The government was under 
pressure to show that the impunity that marked the Pinochet dictatorship had no place in a 
country based on the rule of law.  
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Chile has had two advantages that enabled it to act decisively. Firstly, there is no ruling 
political party in government.203 In South Africa, on the other hand, the ANC has been the 
dominant power in parliament since 1994. This means that, although the official opposition 
party has been instrumental in exposing acts of corruption and seeking redress in the courts, 
they do not have enough political clout to influence political reform. Second, Chile has a low 
level of corruption compared to South Africa. Where corruption in Chile does surface, it is in 
the public eye immediately, and with the emergence of a freer media and NGOs active at 
the civic level, acts of corruption that were previously clandestine are now made public.204  
The Chilean government therefore has a clear standard to uphold and a duty to ensure that 
corruption levels stay low. In South Africa, corruption may be a legacy of Apartheid, but 
because the mandate of the TRC was limited to gross violations of civil and political rights, 
there is no record of the extent of corruption or economic violence committed during 
Apartheid. Compared to the Sierra Leonean Truth Commission, for example, the South 
African TRC has been criticised for having a very limited mandate, with a narrow perspective 
that presented a ‘compromised truth’.205  
There appears to be a lack of appreciation of the importance of prosecutions in South Africa, 
even though there are a number of justifications for trials which extend further than mere 
retribution. The survivors do not so much desire that the perpetrators be punished harshly; 
all they want is to have the good name and honour of their loved ones restored in a public 
forum, for all to hear and see, and to know what happened to their relatives or friend who 
disappeared or were murdered. Prosecutions would acknowledge also the surviving victims, 
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affirming that their claims for justice are legitimate. While it is claimed that corruption is a 
victimless crime, in the case of grand corruption the victims are the citizens who are robbed 
of basic social and economic rights because state funds are siphoned away into the pockets 
of corrupt officials. Secondly, trials assign individual criminal responsibility to leaders and 
key actors who commit crimes and thus remove claims of collective guilt.206 This is 
important for the restoration of the reputation of a government, as it is more desirable for 
certain individuals to be found guilty of corruption than for the people to view their 
governments as being corrupt. And, lastly, trials deter future abusers by signalling to 
potential despots what will happen should they oppress their fellow citizens.207  
4.3. Recommendations 
South Africa is still a very young democracy, with a political and legal order still in relative 
infancy. It is therefore necessary to ensure that democratic institutions function openly and 
properly. The NPA must not act at the bidding of powerful politicians, and must be seen to 
act without fear, favour or prejudice. It is recommended that as part of the checks and 
balances that characterise sound democratic governance, an application should be brought 
to the courts to determine whether the NPA is sufficiently independent from political 
interference.  This will ensure that the powers and the duties of the NPA are interpreted in 
accordance with the values enshrined in the Constitution and, more importantly, that the 
lack of political will in prosecuting both post-TRC crimes and economic crimes is adjudicated 
by the independent courts in accordance with the separation of powers doctrine.  
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Secondly, it is recommended that a unit similar to the ‘Scorpions’ be reconstituted, based 
upon the aforementioned troika principle as its past success is undeniable.208 This unit 
should be given a mandate to focus solely on investigating and prosecuting economic 
crimes. Such a unit would be desirable because it could reduce the burden on the police, 
enabling them to dedicate resources to other priority crimes while not compromising on 
thefight against corruption in the highest echelons of the government. Furthermore, a unit 
operating independently on this specific mandate can help redeem public confidence in the 
government’s commitment to combating corruption and thereby creating a measure of 
increased accountability.   
4.4. Conclusion 
Although truth commissions are significant for fact-finding and reconciliation, trials are 
indispensable for reinforcing justice and the rule of law. The South African TRC achieved 
exemplary success in ushering the country into a peaceful democracy through the provision 
of conditional amnesty for those who appeared before the commission to reveal the truth. 
This carrot presented to perpetrators also carried with it a stick to punish those who 
shunned the process. Unfortunately, the lack of prosecutions turned into de facto blanket 
amnesties which manifested in a culture of impunity. It can be observed from Argentina that 
the pursuit of human rights trials will not threaten the political stability of a country; rather, 
trials have the effect of strengthening democracy while promoting citizen participation both 
domestically and internationally.209 Chile has shown that the passage of time cannot be a 
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hindrance to achieving justice because all that is required is the necessary political will to set 
off the necessary ripple effect.210  
What this paper has found is that an established rule of law is of paramount importance. It 
has also found that it is not enough for there to exist institutions such as the National 
Prosecution Authority, the Office of the Public Protector and a progressive judiciary, if they 
are subject to political manipulation or wholly disregarded. The people and their 
government need to know that no one is above the law. 
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